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Abstract
Background: Trade and investment liberalization may facilitate the spread of sugar-sweetened carbonated
beverages (SSCBs), products associated with increased risk factors for obesity, type II diabetes, and cardiovascular
diseases (Circulation 121:1356–1364, 2010). Apart from a limited set of comparative cross-national studies, the
majority of analyses linking liberalization and the food environment have drawn on case studies and descriptive
accounts. The current failure of many countries to reverse the obesity epidemic calls for investigation into both
individual and systemic factors, including trade and investment policies.
Methods: Using a natural experimental design we tested whether Vietnam’s removal of restrictions on foreign
direct investment (FDI) subsequent to its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007 increased sales of
SSCBs compared with a matched country, the Philippines, which acceded in 1995. Difference-in-difference (DID)
models were used to test pre/post differences in total SSCB sales and foreign company penetration covering the
years 1999–2013.
Results: Following Vietnam’s removal of restrictions on FDI, the growth rate of SSCB sales increased to 12.1 % per capita
per year from a prior growth rate of 3.3 %. SSCB sales per capita rose significantly faster pre- and post-intervention in
Vietnam compared with the control country the Philippines (DID: 4.6 L per annum, 95 % CI: 3.8 to 5.4 L, p < 0.008).
Vietnam’s increase in SSCBs was primarily attributable to products manufactured by foreign companies, whose
annual sales growth rates rose from 6.7 to 23.1 %, again unmatched within the Philippines over this period
(DID: 12.3 %, 95 % CI: 8.6 to 16.0 %, p < 0.049).
Conclusions: Growth of SSCB sales in Vietnam, led by foreign-owned companies, significantly accelerated after
trade and investment liberalization.
Keywords: Trade and investment liberalization, Foreign direct investment, Sugar-sweetened carbonated
beverages, Transnational companies, Natural experiment
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Background
There are growing concerns that liberalized trade and
investment agreements create market conditions that
facilitate the availability, sales, and consumption of
unhealthy dietary products in low- and middle-income
countries [1–3]. Rising consumption of sugar-sweetened
beverages is particularly concerning given the body of
epidemiological evidence linking consumption to obes-
ity, type II diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases [4–6]. In
children, each additional serving of a sugar-sweetened
drink daily was associated with a 0.24 kg/m2 increase in
body mass index and a 1.6 times greater odds of being
obese, after adjusting for anthropometric, demographic,
dietary, and lifestyle variables [7]. 21st century trade
agreements are increasingly used to open markets to
foreign companies, expand investor protections, and
privatize state-owned assets [8, 9]. Between 1995 and
2015, a total of 160 countries joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO), signing up to trade agreements
that, alongside a proliferation of bilateral and regional
treaties, have opened markets to entry of foreign-owned
food and beverage companies.
Increased trade and investment between nations may
have positive health impacts. It can stimulate economic
growth, potentially reducing poverty and its detrimental
health impacts, promote investments in health care, edu-
cation, and other population health determinants, and
increase access to life-saving goods and technologies
[10–12]. However, such health gains are not automatic
and depend on progressive public policy for equitable
distribution throughout society. There are potential
health risks with trade and investment liberalization
[13], including strong theoretical reasons to believe that
trade and investment liberalization will lead to the
spread of sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages (SSCBs)
and other unhealthy dietary products through increased
imports, foreign direct investment, and advertising
[2, 14]. Yet few studies have been able to provide quantita-
tive relational evidence of these effects.
Stuckler and colleagues evaluated exposure to US Free
Trade Agreements across 80 countries, finding that
those nations with a free trade agreement with the
United States had 63.4 % higher soft drink sales per
capita than those that did not, after correcting for GDP
and other macroeconomic confounders [15]. Another
study attempted to empirically link liberalization to diet-
related health outcomes, such as obesity, finding support
for the impact of economic globalization over and above
those accounted for by GDP and urbanization [16]. A
cross-national study of 25 countries between 1999 and
2008 found market deregulation policies facilitated the
spread of fast food outlets, which correlated with higher
population mean body mass indices among high-income
countries. Apart from this limited set of comparative
cross-national studies, the bulk of analyses have drawn
on case studies and descriptive accounts. One study
examined data in Mexico pre- and post-North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), identifying subsequent
increases in US exports of corn, soybeans, sugar, snack
foods, and meat products as well as increased invest-
ment in production, processing, and retailing, that led to
convergence in Mexican and US food systems [17]. An-
other performed a similar analysis of Central America
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), identifying that the
agreement led to increased availability of meat, dairy
and processed food products, promoted domestic meat
production and increased investment in the processed
food market [18]. Case studies of Pacific island coun-
tries also suggest that trade policies accelerate nutrition
transition [19, 20].
Obesity and diabetes continue to be pressing public
health concerns, accounting for 2.8 and 1.5 million deaths
globally each year, respectively [21]. To our knowledge, no
country has reversed its obesity epidemic [22], suggesting
that current approaches are inadequate. Conceptualizing
and addressing the role of structural drivers of diet-related
health outcomes, including trade and investment policy, is
an important development in tackling the complexity of
the problem. Two broadly differing frameworks have
defined public health interventions addressing obesity.
The individualizing framework, both more pervasive and
market-friendly, places the onus on individuals and their
‘lifestyle’ choices, with little to no government regulatory
action concerning the food industry. The systemic frame-
work puts the onus on wider environmental factors and
encourages governments to act on behalf of the public, in-
cluding regulating food markets from production through
to consumption [22]. This paper attempts to unpack some
of the complexity at the systemic level by examining the
role of trade and investment in the creation and mainten-
ance of obesogenic food environments.
Key actors in the creation of food environments are
transnational food and beverage corporations, companies
like Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, which tend to dominate the
soft drink industry in newly liberalized countries. Their
financial positions allow them to invest in aggressive ad-
vertising campaigns with celebrity endorsements, and to
utilize strategic partnerships with retail distributors and
major consumer foodservice chains [23]. In 2013, sales of
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo alone accounted for 68.7 % of the
global carbonated beverage market [24]. As markets for
SSCBs have become saturated in high-income countries
[15], multi-nationals face pressure to identify emerging
markets for growth. In the next five years, PepsiCo and
Coca-Cola project their main source of growth in profits
will come from developing countries [25, 26].
The impetus for the current analysis was to explore
the impacts of previously ratified trade and investment
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treaties within vulnerable nations of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement. At present, 12 Pacific Rim
countries are negotiating what is thought to be the most
economically significant preferential trade and invest-
ment agreement in history, representing a market of 792
million people and 40 % of global GDP [27]. States nego-
tiating the TPP are economically, geographically, and
demographically diverse; with GDP per capita (PPP) ran-
ging from US $4000 in Vietnam to over $62,000 in
Singapore [28, 29]. Vietnam is an especially vulnerable
country involved in the treaty negotiations, with a GDP
per capita over seven thousand dollars less than the next
economically weakest member, Peru [30].
Vietnam’s membership in the TPP negotiations places
it at risk for a number of domestic policy changes and
regulatory restructuring based upon known or antici-
pated content of the proposed treaty [31]. One of the
controversial elements of the treaty is the inclusion of
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms,
details of which have already become public in leaked
draft texts of the TPP agreement. ISDS allows foreign in-
vestors to sue national governments when they feel their
investment has been expropriated due to government
actions, including the ability to seek financial recourse
against state actions addressing public welfare that may
unfavorably affect their investment. This has many in
public health concerned for the viability of introducing
new regulations to control the influx of processed food
and beverages [32, 33], particularly among resource-
constrained developing countries that are key markets
for such products. Vietnam is one of the few countries
that does not currently have any ISDS mechanisms in
place, thus signing the TPP with ISDS would represents
a new vulnerability to which it has not previously been
exposed. This vulnerability becomes more evident when
we consider the effects of recent trade and investment
liberalization on the food environment in Vietnam, since
ISDS provisions in the TPP could make it difficult for it
to introduce new regulations to govern said environment
for public health purposes.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that Vietnam’s
trade liberalization resulting from WTO membership
would lead to a significant increase in SSCB sales, par-
ticularly among foreign companies (namely Coca-Cola
and PepsiCo), contrasted alongside the experience of the
Philippines. Accession to the WTO involves a compre-
hensive set of commitments, obligations and enforce-
ment measures requiring considerable reconstruction of
domestic policies generally perceived to reduce the role
of government in markets while increasingly privatizing
the production and distribution of goods and services
[34]. According to the World Bank the cost of accession
is rising, with higher levels of liberalization expected
from new members [35]. Our study is intended to sit
alongside a similar analytical approach focusing on Peru,
the second ‘least wealthy’ TPP nation [36]. These two
papers contribute to the body of quantitative evidence
exploring the diet-related health effects of trade and
investment agreements by providing robust evidence for
the link between investment liberalization and changes
to the food environment, namely SSCBs. The findings
have implications for how increased trade and invest-
ment liberalization commitments in the TPP will likely
continue affecting health-harmful diet-related changes,
and should be utilized by health and trade ministries to
make informed policy decisions.
Methods
Study design and case selection
We employed a ‘natural experiment’ design, which takes
advantage of variations in the timing, geography, or eli-
gibility of an intervention. These are recommended in
situations when randomized trials are not available for
ethical or pragmatic reasons, as is the case with trade
treaties [37]. Unlike in randomized controlled trials, in a
natural experiment the intervention is assigned by a pol-
icy or other exogenous socio-environmental change, not
by the researcher.
A natural experiment occurred on 11 January 2007
when Vietnam joined the WTO. As part of the agreement,
Vietnam began a process of liberalizing its markets to
allow greater entry by foreign owned companies through
foreign direct investment (FDI); although market access
commitments specific to SSCBs were only fully imple-
mented as of 2009 (see Table 1 for a detailed account of
these commitments). The impacts of Vietnam’s WTO
accession may have been enhanced by a bilateral agree-
ment it entered into with the US in 2001 which largely
paralleled its WTO commitments, permitting US com-
panies access to services relevant to the beverage sector
just weeks before remaining WTO members. As shown in
Fig. 1, there was a substantial entry of FDI into Vietnam
post WTO accession. Prior to entry, from 1999 to 2006,
FDI flows averaged about US $37.0 per capita annually.
Following the trade agreement, the average flow rose to
US $110.6 per capita annually in the years 2007 to 2013.
While it is not possible to obtain a detailed sectoral break-
down, in 2013 manufacture and processing accounted for
56 % of the value of these FDI inflows, while warehouse
and transportation, and wholesale, retail and maintenance
services each captured 2 %; FDI from the beverage indus-
try could potentially be counted in all of the aforemen-
tioned sectors. Currently Vietnam is projected to be one
of the largest growth markets for Coca-Cola and PepsiCo
over the next few years [25, 26].
To identify the impact of the trade agreement on
SSCB sales we compare the intervention group, Vietnam,
with a control group that was not similarly exposed but
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was similar in other respects. Here, neighboring coun-
try, the Philippines, serves as the control. It had early
engagement in trade relations with the United States,
joined the WTO in 1995, and did not experience a
marked change in FDI from 1999 to 2013, but it has a
similar demographic profile and GDP per capita as
Vietnam ($4700 and $4000, respectively) [28, 38] (see
also Table 1 for an overview of the Philippines trade
and investment commitments). We also established a
control product for SSCBs, specifically, an aggregate of
unprocessed foods. These products served as a control,
as previous research has demonstrated these areas are
less likely to be targeted by FDI from transnational
food and beverage companies since they have lower
profit margins [3]. Finally, we were interested in SSCB
sales growth specific to foreign companies, and utilized
domestic company sales as a control variable.
Statistical analysis
We performed four difference-in-difference (DID) models
before and after the 2009 liberalization of SSCB market
access commitments: testing differences in SSCBs between
Table 1 Comparing trade and investment liberalization in
Vietnam and the Philippines
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be facilitated through three different
policy measures: (1) multilateral liberalization commitments under mode
3 (commercial presence) in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS); (2) bilateral or regional liberalization commitments; and
(3) unilateral liberalization commitments made by governments outside
of binding trade and investment treaty commitments. Four economic
sectors are relevant to investments in the SSCB market: wholesale and
retail distribution; services incidental to manufacturing; advertising services;
and market research services. The term liberalization used throughout the
paper refers collectively to these sectors.
The following provides a brief overview of the trade and investment
liberalization strategies of Vietnam and the Philippines, including a review
of the identified service sector commitments at the bilateral (with the US),
multilateral (WTO), and unilateral (domestic) levels.
Vietnam
Bilateral relations with the United States: In 1975, as a result of the victory
of the communist party of North Vietnam over the US-backed anti-
communist party of South Vietnam, the US severed economic relations
with the country until 1994, when the 19 year long trade embargo was
lifted. On 10 December 2001, Vietnam and the US entered into a bilateral
trade agreement which would permit 100 % US invested capital into
wholesale and retail services and unlimited capital contributions on US
joint ventures in advertising and market research services seven years after
entry [58]. Effectively, by 10 December 2008 services relevant to US
beverage companies had been fully liberalized, with the exception
that services incidental to manufacturing were not liberalized through this
agreement. In 2007 the two nations signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement to establish a formal dialogue to discuss new
initiatives to deepen the trade and investment relationship. Currently, the
US and Vietnam are both negotiating members of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement.
Multilateral liberalization: After twelve years of preparation, Vietnam
formally acceded to the WTO on 11 January 2007. Membership in the
WTO required numerous changes to its legal and regulatory framework
regarding taxation, intellectual property, price and foreign exchange controls,
as well as enactment of the Law on Investment and the Law on Enterprises,
both of which made domestic and foreign investors subject to the
same laws and put them on more equal terms [59]. Accession to
the WTO liberalized 105 service sectors in Vietnam, although progressive
liberalization was built into some sectors [60]. Vietnam’s commitments in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) paralleled many of those in
the US bilateral agreement, such that 100 % foreign invested capital into
wholesale and retail services and unlimited foreign capital in joint ventures in
advertising and market research services would be permitted by 1 January
2009, just weeks after the US-bilateral commitments took effect. Additionally,
their WTO commitments included services incidental to manufacturing,
though not taking effect until 1 January 2010, and limited to joint ventures
with foreign capital contribution not exceeding 50 %.
Unilateral liberalization: Countries can unilaterally liberalize foreign investment
in their economies outside of trade treaty commitments. Since Vietnam has
‘locked in’ their foreign investment polices at the multilateral and bilateral
levels, however, a deeper exploration of its unilateral domestic policies on
foreign investment liberalization is unnecessary for our purposes.
The Philippines
Bilateral relations with the United States: On 4 July 1946 the US granted
the Philippines its independence, 48 years after it had been ceded
the archipelago by the Spanish for the amount of $US 20 million.
The US and the Philippines have had uninterrupted economic
relations for more than a hundred years and, although they signed
a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in November
1989, no bilateral trade agreements or investment treaties have
been produced. The Philippines is not currently a negotiating
member of the TPP, although they have expressed strong interest in
joining [61] out of fear of losing their share of the US market to
participating neighboring countries and have been involved in
Table 1 Comparing trade and investment liberalization in
Vietnam and the Philippines (Continued)
technical consultations with the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) [62].
Multilateral liberalization: The Philippines acceded to the WTO upon its
inception on 1 January 1995. The Philippines liberalized 51 service sectors
through the GATS [60]. Notably, their GATS commitments do not include
any guaranteed market access for manufacturing, wholesale or retail,
advertising, or market research services.
Unilateral liberalization: The Philippines went through an accelerated stage
of FDI liberalization domestically in 1991 with their Foreign Investment
Act [63], which permitted foreign equity up to 100 % in any sector not
specified in the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL). The FINL
originally included a section that restricted investment in adequately
served sectors, where no further investments were thought necessary, but
this was abolished in 1996. As of 2012 the FINL does not specify
any limitations on the manufacture or wholesale distribution of food
and beverages, or market research services, though foreign equity in
advertising is limited to 30 %. Retail trade services, previously limited to
Filipino nationals, was liberalized in March 2000 through the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act [64], which allows foreign investors 100 % ownership of
retail business pending a minimum of US$7.5 million in equity.
Contrasting approaches
Vietnam and the Philippines have had considerably different approaches to
trade and investment liberalization. The Philippines engaged with the global
market much earlier on having long-term economic relations with
the US and joining the WTO upon its creation, but has been quite
stagnant since then. Vietnam, as a former closed economy with
strained US relations, was previously relatively inactive in the global
economy. However, as of late it has taken an aggressive approach
to opening its borders to trade and investment, such that Vietnam
has opened twice as many service sectors as the Philippines through GATS,
providing protected market access for these sectors into the future.
Additionally, Vietnam’s liberalization has occurred at the multilateral
level where there are international channels for settling disputes, unlike the
Philippines unilateral liberalization which only provides domestic dispute
procedures for investors.
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Vietnam and the Philippines (1); differences between
SSCBs and unprocessed foods in Vietnam (2a) and in
the Philippines (2b); differences in foreign company
sales between Vietnam and the Philippines (3); and dif-
ferences between foreign and domestic company sales
in Vietnam (4a) and in the Philippines (4b). Our models
were as follows; where T1 represents estimates in the
pre-intervention period; T2 represents estimates in the
post-intervention period; UPF represents unprocessed
foods; and FCS and DCS represent foreign and domes-
tic company sales, respectively:
ΔΔSSCB ¼ ðΔSSCBVietnam SSCBT2− SSCBT1½ 
– ΔSSCBPhilippines SSCBT2– SSCBT1½ Þ
ð1Þ
ΔΔSSCB=UPFPhilippines ¼ ðΔSSCB SSCBT2– SSCBT1½ 
– ΔUPF UPFT2– UPFT1½ Þ
ð2aÞ
ΔΔSSCB=UPFPhilippines ¼ ðΔSSCB SSCBT2– SSCBT1½ 
– ΔUPF UPFT2– UPFT1½ Þ
ð2bÞ
ΔΔFCS ¼ ΔFCSVietnam½FCST2– FCST1ð 
– ΔFCSPhilippines FCST2– FCST1½ Þ
ð3Þ
ΔΔFCS=DCSVietnam ¼ ΔFCS ½FCST2– FCST1ð 
– ΔDCS DCST2– DCST1½ Þ
ð4aÞ
ΔΔFCS=DCSPhilippines ¼ ðΔFCS FCST2– FCST1½ 
– ΔDCS DCST2– DCST1½ Þ
ð4bÞ
The DID models utilized the average of annual per
capita sales estimates over the pre- and post-intervention
years. In order to detect changes in sales we time-lagged
the intervention point one year after liberalization of the
SSCB market access commitments to allow time for the
effects of the new investment commitments to take place.
Thus the intervention year is considered to be 2009 with
the effects of the intervention beginning to take effect in
2010, making our pre-intervention period inclusive of the
years 1999–2009, and the post-intervention period inclu-
sive of the years 2010–2013 (with the exception of sales
data by foreign and domestic companies, which were only
available post 2004). We also conducted a series of sensi-
tivity tests to see whether our results are robust to differ-
ent model specification. Changes in sugar-sweetened
beverages may have been linked to changes in economic
growth. To test this relationship we adjusted our models
for GDP, finding that our results did not qualitatively
change. Next, we included a linear time trend in the
model to test whether the observed increase in sugar-
sweetened beverages is consistent with the background
trend. The observed rise is so large that it is very unlikely to
be explained by the pre-intervention data alone.
After an initial examination of the data it was decided
that actual volumes were only applicable for use in the
first test (comparing SSCB sales volumes between
Vietnam and Philippines), while the remaining analyses
would require growth rates to compensate for variability
in the scales (i.e., contrasting volumes measured in litres
(L) and tonnes, and when ranges of values were too
large for comparison). All models were performed using
STATA v13.0.
Sources of data
Growth of SSCB sales data were taken from the
Euromonitor Database 2014 edition in units of litres per
capita sold off-trade (i.e., through retail outlets), covering
Fig. 1 Trends in FDI Inflows in Vietnam and the Philippines before and after Vietnam’s 2007 WTO accession
Schram et al. Globalization and Health  (2015) 11:41 Page 5 of 13
the years 1999–2013. Euromonitor’s carbonated bever-
ages category is inclusive of all sweetened (both naturally
and artificially) non-alcoholic drinks containing carbon
dioxide, including all carbonated products containing
fruit juice (“sparkling juices”), but excludes tea-based
drink, energy drinks and carbonated bottled water. It is
important to note the variety of sweeteners that can be
utilized. The first category is nutritive sweeteners or caloric
sweeteners, which includes sucrose (sugar cane and sugar
beets [normal table sugar] and its derivatives), as well as
agave nectar, corn syrup, dextrose, fructose, glucose, high-
fructose corn syrup, honey, inverted sugar, lactose, maple
syrup, and molasses [39, 40]. Some sugars naturally occur
in foods (e.g., fructose in fruit juices), while others (e.g.,
sucrose) are added sugars. The second category is nonnu-
tritive sweeteners or noncaloric sweeteners including aspar-
tame, sucralose, saccharin, stevia, acesulfame K, neotame,
nectresse and cyclamates [40, 41].
Carbonated beverages can be sweetened with any
combination of these sweeteners, although high-fructose
corn syrup is the most common source according to US
data [42]. In this article we aim specifically to explore
sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages (i.e., nutritive or
caloric sweeteners) given their link to diabetes and obes-
ity. While Euromonitor does not disaggregate the data
by caloric and noncaloric sweeteners, an examination of
the SSCB market data between 2009 and 2014 by brand
shares reveals that noncaloric or ‘diet’ brands comprise
only 1.4 % of the market in Vietnam and 2.3 % of the
market in the Philippines (data were unavailable before
2009). While it is not possible to remove these diet
products from the aggregated data we believe that their
contribution remains negligible.
Sales of unprocessed foods (i.e., excluding packaged
and processed products) were based on aggregating sales
data for fresh eggs, fruits, meats, nuts, seafood, and vege-
tables. We further disaggregated sales data into those
attributable to foreign and domestic beverage companies.
Results
Comparing SSCBs in Vietnam and the Philippines
Figure 2 shows the trends in SSCB sales in Vietnam and
the Philippines before and after Vietnam’s implementa-
tion of FDI liberalization. Average per capita sales of
SSCBs in Vietnam rose from 1.9 L (95 % CI: 1.6 to 2.2)
to 3.9 L (95 % CI: 3.4 to 4.3) post-intervention. Over the
same period per capita sales in the Philippines dropped
from 28.7 L (95 % CI: 28.4 to 29.0) to 26.1 L (95 % CI:
25.6 to 26.6). The DID model revealed a significant dif-
ference between the two countries pre- and post-
intervention (4.6 L, 95 % CI: 3.8 to 5.4, p = 0.008) that
was robust to adjustments for GDP and underlying time
trends (see Table 2).
Comparing SSCBs with unprocessed food in Vietnam and
the Philippines
Figure 3 displays the trends in sales growth of SSCBs and
unprocessed food within Vietnam and the Philippines.
There was substantial sales growth in SSCBs in Vietnam
post-intervention, with a growth rate of 12.1 % (95 % CI:
11.1 to 13.1) relative to the prior growth rate of 3.3 %
(95 % CI: 2.7 to 4.0); while sales growth in the unpro-
cessed food category remained largely unaffected, with a
post-intervention rate of 2.1 % (95 % CI: 1.1 to 3.1) and a
2.2 % growth rate prior (95 % CI: 1.6 to 2.9). This con-
trasts with the data shown for the Philippines, which
equally had little movement in the growth rates of unpro-
cessed food from pre-intervention (1.5 %; 95 % CI: 1.1 to
1.9) to post-intervention (2.1 %; 95 % CI: 1.5 to 2.8); but
showed a tendency for negative growth rates in SSCB sales
Fig. 2 Trends in SSCB sales in Vietnam and the Philippines before and after Vietnam’s expanded liberalization commitments
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pre-intervention (−2.8 %; 95 % CI: −3.2 to −2.4); and no
discernible trend towards increased growth post-
intervention (1.0 %; 95 % CI: 0.4 to 1.7). The DID model
supported a significant difference between the two cat-
egories in Vietnam (8.9 %; 95 % CI: 7.3 to 10.6, p = 0.011),
robust to adjustment for GDP and underlying time trends,
and no significant difference within the Philippines (3.2 %;
95 % CI: 2.1 to 4.3, p = 0.141, see Table 3).
Comparing foreign company sales growth in Vietnam and
the Philippines
Figure 4 presents the trends in sales growth in millions
of litres of SSCBs by foreign companies in Vietnam and
the Philippines. Foreign sales growth rates in Vietnam
rose rapidly post-intervention from 6.7 % (95 % CI: 4.9
to 8.5) annually to 23.1 % (95 % CI: 21.1 to 25.1), a level
of growth unmatched in the Philippines, which showed
a modest rise from −0.8 % (95 % CI: −2.58 to 1.0) annually
to 3.6 % (1.6 to 5.7). The unadjusted DID model failed to
find a significant difference (p = 0.057); although after
adjusting for GDP and underlying time trends, the differ-
ence between the two countries differences pre- and post-
intervention was significant (12.3 %; 95 % CI: 8.6 to 16.0,
p = 0.049, see Table 4).
Table 2 Pre and post 2010 SSCB sales differences between
Vietnam and the Philippines
Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP
and time trends
Between country 4.6** 4.6** 4.3**
Difference-in-
difference estimate
(1.6) (1.5) (1.3)
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98
**p < 0.01
Fig. 3 Trends in SSCB and unprocessed food sales in Vietnam and the Philippines, before and after Vietnam’s expanded liberalization commitments
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Comparing foreign with domestic company sales growth
in Vietnam and the Philippines
Trends over time in the sales growth of SSCBs in
millions of litres for all foreign and domestic beverage
companies for Vietnam and the Philippines are pre-
sented in Fig. 5. Sales growths for foreign companies in
both countries are reported above. Sales growth for do-
mestic companies declined in Vietnam, from 13.1 %
(95 % CI: 10.2 to 16) annually to −5.8 % (95 % CI: −9.1
to −2.6) post-intervention. The Philippines also had a
considerable decline in domestic sales growth over the
same period, from 18.0 % (95 % CI: 15.1 to 20.9) annu-
ally to 2.3 % (95 % CI: −1.0 to 5.6). The DID model sup-
ported a significant difference between foreign and
domestic sales growth in Vietnam (35.4 %; 95 % CI:
29.3 to 41.5, p = 0.002), robust to adjustment for GDP
and underlying time trends, and no significant differ-
ence within the Philippines (20.1 %; 95 % CI: 11.0 to
29.2, p = 0.170, see Table 5).
Foreign and domestic company concentration in Vietnam
and the Philippines
Sales of SSCBs in the Philippines are more heavily concen-
trated within foreign companies (98.3 % of all sales in
2013, up from 94.5 % in 2004) than in Vietnam (82.6 % of
all sales in 2013, up from 74.0 % in 2004). Within the
Philippines, Coca-Cola is the dominant player accounting
for 72.1 % of all sales in 2013 (a slight drop from 74.2 % in
2004); PepsiCo is a distant second, with 14.3 % of sales in
2013 (relatively unchanged from 14.4 % in 2004).
Canadian company Cott Corp saw a notable increase to
11.9 % of sales in 2013 (up from 5.9 % in 2004) ostensibly
drawn from sales previously captured by the other category,
which dropped from 5.4 to 1.5 % over this period. Domestic
brand Zest-O-Corp holds a minuscule percentage of the
market, growing from 0.1 % in 2004 to 0.3 % in 2013.
PepsiCo and Coca-Cola are in closer competition in
Vietnam, holding respectively 40.1 % and 36.8 % of all
sales in 2013, a small change from 37.4 % and 35.0 % in
Table 3 Pre and post 2010 differences in SSCB and unprocessed foodsa within Vietnam and the Philippines
Vietnam Philippines
Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP and time trends Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP and time trends
Within
country
8.9* 8.9* 8.9* 3.2 3.2 3.1
Difference-
in-difference
estimate
(3.2) (3.2) (3.4) (2.1) (2.1) (2.2)
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45
*p < 0.05
aAggregate of sales growth in tonnes of eggs, meats, seafood, fruits, vegetables and nuts
Fig. 4 Trends in Foreign SSCB sales in Vietnam and the Philippines, before and after Vietnam’s expanded liberalization commitments
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2004. Vietnamese domestic companies, Chuong Duong
Beverages JSC and Saigon Beverages JSC, which com-
bined held between 13 % and 21 % of the market share
from 2004 to 2012, folded after 2012. A new domestic
company Saigon Alcohol Beer and Beverages Corp
appeared on the market in 2013, although it accounts
for only 7.8 % of the market share. A portion of this for-
feited market appears to have been captured by PepsiCo,
as well as Chinese company Uni-President Enterprises
Corp (now holding 4.4 % of market share) and Peruvian
company Aje Group (with 1.2 % of market share). The
other category, while in flux during this period, held
9.4 % of market share in both 2004 and 2013.
Contribution to added sugar in the Vietnamese diet
Over the intervention period per capita sales of SSCBs
rose by 2 l annually in Vietnam. Nutrition information
provided by Coca-Cola,1 which distributes the top selling
SSCB in Vietnam (Coca-Cola, 22 % of market share)
reports 39 g of sugar in 12 fluid ounces. Thus 2 l of
Coca-Cola would potentially introduce approximately
220 g of added caloric sugar per capita per year into the
Table 4 Pre and post 2010 differences in foreign sales between
Vietnam and the Philippines
Unadjusted Adjusted
for GDP
Adjusted for GDP and
time trends
Between country 12.1**** 12.4* 12.3*
Difference-in-
difference estimate
(5.8) (5.4) (5.6)
R-squared 0.73 0.78 0.78
*p < 0.05, ****p = 0.057
Fig. 5 Trends in foreign and domestic SSCB Sales in Vietnam and the Philippines, before and after Vietnam’s expanded liberalization commitments
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Vietnamese diet wholly from SSCBs. This is not a dra-
matic increase, although Euromonitor predicts that con-
sumption will rise by another 7 l per capita per year by
2019, which could introduce another 770 g of added
sugar. Moreover, SSCBs are not the only product intro-
ducing increased availability of sugar in the beverage
market, in Vietnam one of the fastest growing soft drink
sectors are ready to drink teas with per capita sales ris-
ing from 0.2 l annually in 2000 to 9 l in 2013, almost
double carbonate sales, making this another important
area to watch for dietary change.
Discussion
Our analyses revealed two main findings. First, in the year
after Vietnam opened its markets to foreign companies,
there was a significant increase in sales of SSCBs that was
not seen in the control country, Philippines, or in other
food sectors we would expect to be unaffected, i.e., unpro-
cessed foods. Second, the main beneficiaries of this growth
were foreign beverage companies, namely Coca-Cola and
PepsiCo, while domestic beverage companies lost market
share. These findings together provide substantial support
for the link between trade and investment liberalization
and changing food environments characterized by increas-
ingly dominant foreign multinational companies and their
archetypal unhealthy dietary products, specifically SSCBs.
Worth noting is that the Philippines, which joined the
WTO upon its inception in 1995, had a much larger
domestic SSCB market relative to Vietnam. This is con-
sistent with previous findings that trade relations, par-
ticularly those with the US, lead to changes in food
imports and exports that result in foreign food environ-
ments more closely mirroring those in the US [17].
Vietnam had delayed trade relations with both the US
and the WTO, which may explain its relatively small,
albeit rapidly growing, SSCB market. The data revealed
that the Philippines has been experiencing declines in
SSCB sales over the years, which can potentially be
explained by an emergence of healthy behaviours after
the recognition of an expansion in degenerative diseases
due to unhealthy dietary patterns [43]. There is no guar-
antee that Vietnam will reach the level of consumption
of countries like the Philippines or the US, in fact, with
the advent of globalization and an increased awareness
of global health concerns, Vietnam has the opportunity to
capitalize on healthy eating trends to mitigate the develop-
ment of a noncommunicable disease epidemic at a much
earlier stage.
Our results are also consistent with market reports
from Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. In 2012 Coca-Cola an-
nounced that they would invest US $300 million into
Vietnam, bringing their total investment up to US $500
million since 2010 [44]. The supply chain manager for
Coca-Cola Vietnam remarked that growth has been very
fast since 2009 and that their facilities have struggled to
meet the demand. Coca-Cola has made investments in
its existing plants to maximize production, increasing
hourly output from 24,000 bottles to 28,000 bottles in
Ho Chi Minh City, and from 30,000 bottles to 35,500
bottles in Hanoi [45]. The company has also invested in
new cold-drink coolers to improve sales in local retailers
[44]. PepsiCo announced a new investment of US $250
million into Vietnam as of 2011 [46], and has opened
three new facilities since 2009, a number equal to what
it had opened since entering Vietnam in 1994 [47, 48].
The new facilities include one that was announced to be
the largest food and beverage production plant in Asia
[46]. Prior to these investments, in the first approximately
16 years that both companies operated in Vietnam, Coca-
Cola had invested less than US $150 million and PepsiCo
around US $250 million, amounts equal to, or consider-
ably less (in the case of Coca-Cola) than what they have
committed in just the past few years [46, 49]. Announce-
ments of investments into the Philippines have been
sparser. In 2013 Coca-Cola announced a commitment to
put US $1 billion into the Philippines over a 5 year period,
where their original investment was considerably larger,
with 22 plants to maintain [50]. This came in the same
month that Coca-Cola announced it would be moving its
concentration plant operations from the Philippines to
Singapore, cited as a need to improve efficiencies [51].
There was an announcement from PepsiCo that they
would be investing PH $650 million (approximately US
$14.5 million) into the Philippines, although this was lim-
ited to their snack foods brands, rather than an invest-
ment in beverage manufacturing [52].
Our key findings, namely the growth of Vietnam’s
SSCB market captured chiefly by foreign companies after
Table 5 Pre and post 2010 differences between foreign and domestic sales within Vietnam and the Philippines
Vietnam Philippines
Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP and time trends Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP and time trends
Difference-
in-difference
estimate
35.4** 35.0** 33.6** 20.1 19.6 21.7
(9.4) (9.2) (8.85) (13.9) (13.7) (13.1)
R-squared 0.56 0.61 0.68 0.25 0.33 0.44
**p < 0.01
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FDI liberalization, have important implications for the
current TPP negotiations. Vietnam as a promising emer-
ging market will continue to be a prime target for for-
eign investors looking for growth rates no longer seen in
developed countries. Although the data presented in this
paper are limited to carbonated beverages sold in retail
stores, Vietnam is expected to see further development
of their consumer foodservices sector, particularly with
leading fast food chains, including KFC, Lotteria, and
Jollibee, with whom both PepsiCo Vietnam and Coca-Cola
Beverages Vietnam Co Ltd have been collaborating. Foun-
tain sales of soft drinks are forecasted to see increased
growth in the next few years making this an important area
to watch for increased sales and consumption of SSCBs
and an important area for future research [53].
Returning to our concern with the TPP agreement and
its inclusion of ISDS provisions, Vietnam has already
experienced the so-termed regulatory chill associated
with trade and investment agreements, and particularly
those with ISDS mechanisms. Regulatory chill occurs
when a government alters, delays, or abandons regulatory
reform out of concern of a trade or investment dispute. A
recent attempt by the Vietnamese government to intro-
duce an excise tax on carbonated soft drinks on the
grounds that they posed a health risk, was abandoned in
July 2014 just months after the American Chamber of
Commerce, representing American carbonated beverage
companies, released their response stating that “There is a
possibility that the tax could be found by international
trade bodies to violate Vietnam’s free trade agreements,
and it will certainly erode foreign investors’ confidence in
Vietnam’s commitment to the national treatment principle
[54].” If the Vietnamese government decides to ratify the
TPP with its ISDS mechanism in what is purported to be
the most comprehensive agreement to date with nations
such as the US, which are economically stronger and have
considerably more experience in utilizing ISDS provi-
sions, it should do so fully aware of the financial and
regulatory repercussions to which they are opening
themselves up.
A randomized controlled trial of national trade policy
and population dietary outcomes would be inconceiv-
able, thus we made constructive use of naturally occur-
ring conditions in Vietnam and the Philippines to help
estimate such effects. Natural experiments can yield
valuable evidence where it would be otherwise unattain-
able. Future analyses of this nature could be strength-
ened by excluding alternative explanations, including a
wider range of falsification tests, or the use of a synthetic
control (a composite of multiple regions), rather than a
single control country. Additionally, there may have
been one or more significant events that took place in
Vietnam that may equally or better explain our findings
that were outside of the knowledge and control of the
researchers. One potential confounder is the parallel
introduction of bilateral commitments through the US-
Vietnam bilateral agreement, making it difficult to disen-
tangle which specific trade and investment liberalization
agreement led to the changes in the SSCB market, in all
likelihood both streams of liberalization contributed to
growth in this market.
Other factors that may contribute to a country’s in-
vestment climate include political and economic stabil-
ity, infrastructure, wages, corporate tax structures, tax
incentives for FDI (including export processing zones)
and proximity to main markets (to reduce transport
costs) [55, 56]. To our knowledge there were no consid-
erable changes in these factors in Vietnam during our
intervention period. Attributing specific patterns in FDI
to trade and investment agreements is challenging with
even the most sophisticated econometric techniques;
this is due in part to the long-term implementation
periods of these agreements which make it challenging
to capture all FDI activity attributable to the agreement
and the difficulty in obtaining disaggregated FDI data
due to confidentiality provisions [57]. Deciding where to
introduce the time of intervention is also complicated.
Our intervention period of 2009, although capturing almost
all liberalization we identified as relevant to SSCBs, did not
account for the full implementation of commitments inci-
dental to manufacturing, which did not take effect until 1
January 2010. Our findings are limited by the restricted
range of data available, particularly after Vietnamese imple-
mentation of WTO commitments; the trends in our data
are just emerging and will need further analysis with
additional data points to validate. Finally, while this analysis
focused on Vietnam and the Philippines the intention is
that the results will be generalizable to these broader
patterns of trade and investment liberalization.
Conclusions
The current analysis has provided much needed additional
quantitative evidence for the link between investment
liberalization and changes to the food environment,
namely SSCBs. Ongoing efforts to monitor the impacts of
trade and investment agreements on food environments
[2] will assist in shifting the discourse for action to address
the growing burden of diet-related noncommunicable dis-
eases away from individual-oriented strategies to systemic
frameworks that recognize structural drivers, including
transnational corporations and their supporting neoliberal
market liberalization infrastructure. Unifying efforts to
build a body of evidence empirically demonstrating the
contribution of trade and investment policies to changing
food environments and patterns of health outcomes is a
first step in being able to make defensible policy decisions
to mitigate these impacts.
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Endnotes
1http://productnutrition.thecoca-colacompany.com/
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